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Work Effort, Investible Surplus and the Inferiority
of Competition

The elegance of the marginal productivity theory of distribution has
practically banished residual theories from economic analysis.

Yet the mar

ginal productivity theory rests on the assumption of linear homogeneous pro
duction functions in a perfectly competitive world,

Moreover, the theory

requires in the event of a rigidity in the supply price of one of the factors
of production that the quantity or it used be adjusted to its marginal prod
uct.

The efforts or unions to control the supply price of' labor have been

analyzed along such lines.

There may, however, be situations in which both

the supply price and the quantity employed or a factor of production are
subject to constraints and these are such that a marginal productivity solu
tion is neither feasible nor desirable.

If priority is given in this way to

the remuneration and employment of one :factor of production, the need f'or a
residual theory of' distribution and employment becomes apparent.

Furthermore,

in such circumstances perfect competition will be an imperfect institutional
arrangement for achieving the desired ends.
The subsistence setting for production in many developing countries m9¥
be analyzed more effectively in these terms.

The subsistence community may

give a high priority to the employment of its population refusing to accept
the unemployment which might be necessary if those employed were to be paid
their marginal product.

This kind of accomodation of the community's re

sources to the population it must support has most frequently been discussed
in terms of an institutional wage. [e.g., 7:22]
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The term "institutional wage" suggests that something better could be
done in the circumstances, that the wage has been determined without full
consideration being given to the economic variables and consequences involved.
It would, of course, be foolhardy to suggest that economic arrangements in
subsistence settings are in reality optimal.

Nevertheless, analysis in terms

of optimality suggests that many of the observed characteristics of subsis
tence societies might have been predicted by departing from the marginal pro
ductivity theory and the perfect competition which it implies.

When compared

with marginal productivity outcomes, these characteristics include the over
employment (in terms of numbers of workers and total work effort) and under
utilization (in the sense of work effort per person) of labor and the non
competitive organization of production.
If these characteristics can be shown under appropriate circumstances
to be consistent with optimality, some of the policy prescriptions associated
with marginal productivity theory and perfect competition must be brought
into question.

The idea that perfect competition will yield optimum results

may be wrong and developing countries which seek to follow that path may in
tact reduce their opportunities for growth.

Reliance on the unemployment of

resources as a signal that the related factor price is too high may lead to
inefficient price manipul.ations.

Indeed, the view that factor prices can

be manipulated to achieve an optimum utilization of resources may in these
circumstances require reexamination.

Possibly a more effective approach

would be to manipulate the employment of resources directly, the factor
prices which emerge being optimum.

I shall try to show that these outcomes,
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heretical as they may appear to be, have a logical basis.
A fundamental tool for the analysis is the biological function relating
the maximum atnount of work which an individual can perform to the nature and
quantity of the food he eats and the efficiency with which his body can trans
form gross food enerty into bodily maintenance and external effort.

Such a

biological relationship must dondition the individual's supply of labor in
any setting, but its relevance for economic analysis is probably greatest in

dealing with situations of near subsistence.

Indeed in such situations this

biological basis for economic theory would seem to merit recognition equal
to that accorded the technological production function with which it has much
in common.

Professor Leibenstein has recently incorporated a function of

this kind· into his analysis of developing economies [8: esp. Ch. 6) and Pro
fessor Wonnacott has extended that analysis in a number of useful ways.
(12]

I hope to build on their ve-ry constructive contributions~

Cost and Distribution of Work Effort
.An assumption critical to the analysis to follow is that the biologi

cal function relating individual effort to energy inputs exhibits diminishing
returns in the relevant range.

It will help to strengthen the credibility ot

this assumption if we make a brief excursion into the biological roots ot the
function.
Let us assume that the composition of an individual's diet is fixed and
that it meets certain minimum but unspecified dietary requirements.

Only the

scale of the diet is variable.
The gross energy cf the diet, i.e., the combustion value of the food,
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is to be converted by bodily function into usable or net energy.

The differ

ence between gross and net energy represent s energy losses of various types
including indigesti ble or fecal energy, which varies with the type of food
and the nature of the feeding animal, urinary and fermentat ion energy, and
the heat increment of feeding {a kind of food utilizatio n tax).

[3:25 ff)

We shall assume that the first demand for usable energy is to maintain
the body, any excess being energy output.

In the short term of course, there

could be a substitut ion of energy output for maintenan ce, but in the long
term such substitut ion may be severely limited in scope.

Energy output in

the long term is therefore a function of energy input, given the human con
version mechanism, the nature of energy inputs, and environm ental factors.
Figure 1 presents such a function for an individua l.

For later con

venience energy inputs are measured on the vertical axis, energy outpus on
the horizonta l.

The gross energy required for maintenan ce is depicted as

the vertical distance,

OM.

Om, which maintains the body.

This is converted into the net energy output,
If energy inputs exceeds

becomes available for growth and work.
gy which the body can generate, and

mb

Ob

OM, net energy

represent s the maximum net ener

is the maximum net energy that can

be made available for work in a steady state adult.
As drawn in Figure 1, the curve exhibitin g diminishi ng returns tbrough
outp.

For purposes of economic analysis, however, it is sufficien t to assume

diminishi ng returns occur at lower levels of inputs, these will be buried
in the "maintena nce box," and will not affect the analysis of visible effort.
We make this assumptio n for subsequen t analysis unless stated otherwise .
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Dispose of the maintenance box by making m the origin.

The portion of

the curve to the right of m is a simple total cost curve showing for an
adult the energy inputs necessary to produce various amounts of work energy.
The vertical distance,

mM, has the characteristics of fixed cost.

The tangent

to the curve which passes through m indicates equality between margihal and
average cost and the minimum average cost of producing work energy.

When this

condition holds, work energy of ma(= hx) is produced at a total cost of
OE • 1
X

Now assume that any diet must be divided equally between two identical
men.

The curve representing the aggregate work energies which can be gener

ated with alternative energy inputs is the locus of points obtained by doub
ling the coordinates with respect to the new origin m of points on the
original curve drawn for one adult.
Given our assumptions of diminishing returns and identical men, the
equal division of the aggregate diet is optimum in the sense that no other
will yield a larger aggregate work energy.

To demonstrate that this is so,

let
E

= aggregate gross energy

H = aggregate work energy

m = net maintenance
a= proportion of
With

E given to one man.

E fixed, we wish to maximize

H = f(aE) + f[(l -a) E] - 2m,
which requires that
fl (aE) = f 1 [(l - a)E].
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As each adult has the same work energy curve and its slope is unique at each
point with diminishing returns throughout, this equality also requires that
= (1- ), that is, the aggregate diet must be divided equally between the two

men.

less efficient use of the aggre

Any other division will represent a

gate diet.

2

For convenience we now assume that energy outputs can be measured in
standard hours per week, the intensity of effort already being optimized.
Notice in Figure 1 that any ray from

m which intersects the single adult

energy curve will do so at two points (except the vertical line at
the tangent to the curve which passes through m ).

m and

Each ray (exceptions

as noted) may be assigned two values each representing hours of work per
week as determined by the points of intersection.
be larger than h X , the other smaller.

One or these values will

For the smaller values a steeper

ray means lower hours or work; for the larger values, a steeper rar means
higher hours.

Notice also that as curves for larger numbers of adults are

constrticted by increasing coordinates in proportibn, the pair of per capita
values assigned to any ray is independent of the $ize of the adult popula
tion.
The slope of any ray is, of course, the real wage per hour.

The

steeper the ray the higher the real wage, two levels of individual work ef
fort being associated with each real wage.

In a classical competitive wage

paying economy only the larger level of effort for each wage would have
significance.

It is, however, a distinguishing characteristic of overpopu

lated situations that the lower level of effort may have greater relevance.
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Population and Hours of Work
In Figure 2 total hours of work per week are shown on the horizontal
axis.
(OM

Energy inputs are measured on the vertical a.xis in maintenance units
in Figure 1).

A family of cost curves can now be constructed, four of

which are shown in Figure 2.

Take the curve originating at

N

X

as typical.

N in size for which the ma.in
x
(M being the unit of measurement) • When average cost

This curve is drawn for the body of workers
tenance cost ie

Nx

per hour of weekly work is at a minimum, total cost is
units which produces

NX hX hours of work per week.

Ex maintenance
The ray from the ori-

gin drawn tangent to this curve is labelled bx, the number of hours of
weekly work per worker associated with minimum average cost.

Given the

family of work energy curves so constructed it will be noted that the ray

designated hx

is also the ctit-ve describing the minimum total cost of pro

dticihg any given number of wotk hours per week.

The cost structure which has been described depicts the transforma
tion of gross energy inputs into work energy outputs.

But in a subsistence

setting the gross energy inputs, food, must themselves be produced by com
bining work energy with other factors of production.

Assume the supply of

these and a linear, homogeneous production function to be fixed.

Assume

also that hours of work are homogeneous so that total food output is unaf
fected by substitutions between numbers of workers and hours of work per
worker provided only that the total hours of work available are not changed.
Under these assumptions a total product function has been introduced in
Figure 2.
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The model which results can be summarized in the followin g equation s.

(1)

P = g(K,H)

(2)

E

= N(m = t[h])

(3)

V

=

P - E

(linear, homogeneous producti on
function accordin g to which capi
tal, K, and bours of work, H,
a.re combined to produce output, P)
(cost function describi ng the food
inputs, E, necessa ry to support
a working populat ion, N , when each
member requires m for maintena nce
of himself and depende nts and sup
plies h hours of work per week,
H = Nh.T
(investi ble surplus , the maximum
output which could be invested ).

We assume that each member of the community's working populati on will or can
be made to work to his biologic al maximum so that none of the investib le sur
plus accrues to individu als all of it going to the community as a social or
ganizati on, one or more coopera tives, a monopso nist, or a number of perfectl y
competi tive firms as the case may be.

Equation (2) is a cost curve; supply

conside rations will be consider ed in a later section.
The community which accepts the respons ibility to support its members
will tre~t its populati on as given for the purpose of product ion.

The cost

of generati ng work effort will then be describe d by one ·of the family of
cost curves in Figure 2, say the curve Nb.

The coIDill'Uility, wishing to maxi

mize its investib le surplus, will do so by producin g that output tor which
the margina l product of hours of work, the slope of the total product curve,
is equal to the margina l cost of generat ing work effort , the slope ot the
total cost curve. 3 That output is Pb for which the total cost of work
effort is ~ .

The labor cost per hour is given by the slope of the ray
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d1°0:;m

throug h the origin and point

b •

It exceed s the margin al produ ct.

It

:!\;llows that the return to the other factor of produ ction, capita
l, is less
the.n its margin al produc t and is a residu al.
The same community behav ior with popula tions of other sizes would
yield
other equili brium cost points such as

2..,

~

and !!. • The curve oxbm ,

which conne cts these equili brium cost points descri bes how the quant
ity and
cost of work effort respon d to changes in popula tion given the produ
ction
tuncti on. 4 While total work effort and total labor cost rise as popul
ation
increa ses, work effort per person falls- -in Figure 2 from 1.2 h
at o to
X
0.5 h at m. As a consequence the labor cost per person , the cost
of
X
genera ting his work effor t, must also fall. On the other hand, the
cost of
work effort per hour falls between 2. and x but rises therea fter.

We conclu de then that when a community is organi zed to give priori ty
to its socia l obliga tion to suppo rt and mainta in its popul ation, leisur
e
and pover ty go hand in hand. As popul ation grows hours of work and
inves
tible surplu s per capita declin e and beyond N total inves tible
surplu s
X
5
e,lso declin es.
Organ izatio nal Effect s on Employment and Inves tible Surplu s
The essen tial point is that this mode of community behav ior enable
s
fully employed non-la bor resour ces to be accomodated to the employ
ment of
popul ations rangin g in size from N to Nm, furnis hing hours of
work
0
which vary from H to H and produc ing outpu ts from P to P
0
m
o
m • Per•
feet compe tition, on the other hand, does not permit such a wide range
of
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adJustment.

It is premised on equality between hourly wage rates and marginal

products, competition among workers ensuring that the wage is not in excess ot
the supply price and competition among firms ensuring that it is not below
marginal product.

In these circumstances the only labor cost ad.Justments

possible in Figure 2 must lie on the

£!_

curve , points on Which represent

total labor costs when hourly wages equal marginal products.

When non-labor

resources are fully employed the competitively organized community will em
ploy work effort in the range
P

0

to

Px.

H

0

to Hx and produce outputs ranging from

The employed population cannot exceed Nx but it might at the

other extreme be less than

N

0

depending on the terms on which labor time

will be supplied in a scarce labor situation.
whose supply eurve will pass through

population in excess of Nx

!:. •

There will be some population

It is clear, however, that any

must under competitive conditions be unemployed.

These results are depicted in alternative and perhaps more familiar
form in Figure 3.

Here average and marginal product and average and marginal

cost are related to aggregate hours of work for populations of different
sizes.

Each population is treated as tixed in a manner technioally similar

to the analysis ot size of plant and equipment.

Given the size of its popu

lation, which the community treats as fixed, the community utilizes that
population in order to maximize investible. surplus.

It arranges to obtain

from its population that aggregate work etto:rt tor which marginal cost equals

marginal product.

The curve,

~

describes the equilibrium average costs

of utilizing populations of different sizes.
competitively-, however, the portion,

£!_ ,

If the community is organized

of the marginal product curve
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3

represe nts the feasible wage and aggrega te hour alternat ives.

While popula

tion may be regarded by the co~it y as fixed in the social sense of oblige.
tion,.i t is not fixed in the t~chnol ogical sense of product ion.

It populati on

is actually larger than Nx, both the profit-m aximizin g monopo list and the
I '
profit-m aximizin g set of competi
tors ~ill ensure that the excess is unemployed.

Whether the symptoms· of surplus labor take the form of underut ilizatio n or
unemployment of labor depends then, as Profess or Lewis has noted [9:326- 7], on
the way in which economic activity is organize d,
The question arises as to whether net. investib le surplus could be in
creased by reorgan izing a traditio nal community along competi tive lines with
the government collecti ng taxes to meet the subsiste nce needs of the unem
ployed.

The answer is no.

Such a subsidy arrangement would leave the com

munity worse off than it was before.

It has already been establis hed that

any given level of work effort oijn be obtained at lowest cost from a given
populati on by sharing the work equ~ly .
of generati ng

Hx units of

work

In Figure 2, for example, the cost

effort from a populati on Nb

in size when

all are equally employed,

H:il , is greater than the cost of producin g that

work effort with Nx men,

Hx!,. • But if the populati on is actually Nb ,

we must with the employment of only
needs of the unemployed.

Nx men provide for the subsiste nce

These equal xa
-

tioal axis).

(equal to

Nb - N

X

on the ver-

Therefo re the social cost ot employing less than the entire

labor force exceeds the social cost of full employment by na , where
-

are employed, and by the differen ce between the curves !. b
larger numbers are employed.

N

X

and !!. b when

We see then that it is not only better to share
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Hx hours of work among the

Nb popula tion, but investi ble surplu s can be

furthe r increas ed by expanding the work effort of that popula tion to

I\,.

This argument would hold as strongl y for a more subtle and possib ly mis
leading type of organi zationa l change . Suppose that only a part of the over
popula ted community's resourc es is reorgan ized along compe titive lines, the
rest remain ing as a traditi onal sector respon sible for utilizi ng whatev er
popula tion it must.

The reorgan ized sector is assumed to have no additio nal

capita l and to involve no techno logical change.

It will be profita ble, how

ever, to reduce hourly wages, increas e hours of work, raise wages per man
employed, fire some workers and reduce output .

Apparent invest ible surplus

and the margin al produc t of labor in the reorgan ized sector will rise.
The traditi onal sector accepts its respon sibility to absorb the un
employed if indeed it is able to do so. Hourly costs will rise but hours of
work and costs per man and margin al produc t will fall. Total hours of work
and output will rise, but our symbol of compet itive succes s, invest ible sur
plus, will fall.

It must, as the earlier argument indicat ed, fall by more

than the increas e which occurs in the reorgan ized sector .

The community as

a whole is worse off.
But the reorgan ized sector can demons trate its superi ority.

It in

vestib le surplus per unit of capita l or of labor is higher than in the tra
dition al sector and the margin al produc t of labor is higher as well.

The

margin al produc t of capita l is lower but as capita l is not paid its margin al
produc t in the traditi onal sector , and may even be receivi ng nothin g, this
is
a quibble . Perhaps it would be wise to reorgan ize the traditi onal sector
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along the new lines.

The result as we have seen would be substanti al unem

ployment whose subsidy through government would leave the community as a whole
worse off although the private sector would be demoristr ating apparent pro
fitabilit y.

The social cost of private profit in these circumsta nces might

not be sufficien tly apparent to reverse the reorganiz ation and indeed such a
reorganiz ation may not be rever~ibl e.

Neverthe less, the higher marginal

product of labor in the competiti ve sector rightly suggests the social ad
vantage to be obtained by transferr ing labor from the tradition al to the com
petitive sector.
Achieving Optimum Employment of Labor
Labor will be regarded as optimally employed if, given the populatio n
and its desire for leisure, investibl e surplus is maximized .

We shall con

tinue, however, to treat the disutilit y of labor as zero, consideri ng later
the possible trade off between investibl e surplus and leisure.
The fundamen tal differenc e between the competiti vely organized and
social1y responsib le communiti es is in the variables to ~hich they directly
respond.

In factor markets perfect competito rs adjust their behavio~ to

factor prices; in labor markets the "active variable" is the hourly wage
rate and the quantity employed (total hours) is the "response variable" in
the sense that it is adjusted to the hourly wage rate.

In the socially re

sponsible community, on the other hand, the populatio n, or more accuratel y
the labor force, is the active variable and labor costs and hours of work
are response variables .

-17Reference to Figure 4 may clarify the significance of this distinctioh
for the problem at hand.

Investible surplus is plotted against employment

and/or the labor force.

Now strictly speaking hours of work and not numbers

of people is the factor of production but our ultimate inte~est is in investi
ble surplus per capita not per hour of work.

It should also be recalled

from Figure l that a wage per person is uniquely related to his hours of work
but that an hourly wage is generally related to two possible levels of work
effort.

Moreover, at a given hourly wage the perfect competitor can obtain

the total hours of work he desires in two ways between which we assume he
has no preference--by working a few people long hours or by working many
people ~hort hours.

We assume for our experiment that a wage per man is

specified to competitors.
Take in Figure 2 the wage per man represented by the ray through the
origin and point ~.

The investible surplus which our competitors can make

in the aggregate by employing a population of given size is the vertical dis
tance between this ray and the total product curve at the point where the
population cost curve intersects the ray.

Performing this operation for

various populations yields the data fepresented by the curve labelled Wm

itl Figure 4.

By changihg the giveh wage per man a family of such curves

can be drawn of which Wc'

Wm'

Wb(L),

Wx,

W0 ,

and Wb(H)

are examples

in Figure

4. Wc represents the lowest wage per man shown and Wb(H) the

highest.

Hourly wages, however, fall from the

and rise to the

Wb(H)

curve.

The two

Wb

curve to the

WX

curve

curves demonstrate the indif

ference of our perfect competitors to the number of men from whom a given
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work effort is obtained .
.

Wb (H}

.

and Wb (L}

represen t the same hourly wage

.

and yield the same ma.J{ifuum profit, at which aggrega te work effort is the same.
Only the wage per man, his hours of work and the number of men employed are
differen t.
Now draw another curve through the maximum points of this family of
curves.

This curve describe s the employment response of a competi tively or

ganized community to alternat ive levels of wages.

The usual analysis of com

petition deals ohly with the rising portion of' this "respons e-to-wag es curve"

(RW) where employment is eqtial to or less than

N

X

Competi tion among

workers of a larger labor force will force the hourly wage rate to its mini
m'Uin at which the wage per man is
An

Wx

envelope curve drawn tangent to each of the family of wage curves

(except those such as

Wb(H)

for which less than full use of non-lab or re

sources is preferab le) represen ts the traditio nal commun ity's adjustm ent to
differen t sizes of its populati on.

Given the labor force and a commitment

to its full emplo;Y'inent the wage response of the community is the wage line
tangent to the "respons e-to-emp loyment curve" (RE) at that level of employ
ment.

it is the wage which maximizes investib le surplus given the labor

force and its full employment.

It reflects the same data as does the

oxbm

curve in Figure 2.
We can now draw the followin g conclusi on:
its related populati on) except
the

REN

N

X

for any labor force (and

the community behavio r represen ted by

curve yields a higher investib le surplus than the competi tive

behavio r represen ted by the

RW

curve.

The reason is neither complex or
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strange.

It is that the marginal cost of producing work effort is not equal,

except for the population

Nx , to the average cost and to the marginal prod

uct of that level of work effort.

For populations in excess of

N

X

marginal

cost is less than average cost and investible surplus is maximized when mar
ginal cost equals marginal product, i.e., when labor cost per hour exceeds
the marginal product of labor.

Indeed, when poptilation is less than

Nx, as

might be expected in advanced countries, perfect competition does not lead to
maximum investible

surplus.

In this situation marginal cost exceeds average

cost and investible surplus will be maximized when marginal cost is equated
to marginal product, i.e., when labor cost per hour is less than the marginal
product of work effort.
Let us digress a moment to discuss another related proposition which is
also valid but which may at first sight appear to be anomalous.

It is that

for any given wage per man appropriate to full employment as indicated by
tangency with the

RE

curve in Figure

4, except the wage Wx perfect co:rh

petition would yield a larger investible surplus than would be obtained with
employment-conscious community behavior.

Figure 5 demonstrates this point.

Investible surplus is plotted against wager per man.

We first construct a

family of iso-employment curves by observing in Figure 2 for a given number
of workers how investible surplus changes as the wage per man is increased.
Take the labor force,

Nb , as an example.

ray which intersects the

Nb

curve at

At the wage represented by the

£., investible surplus is zero.

As

the wage per man (and aggregate and average hours of work) is increased, in
vestible surplus rises to a maximum at the wage denoted by the ray intersecting

-21-

the

Nb

curve at

b

and for higher wages per man falls.

The curve drawn

through the maximum points of this family of curves and labelled

REN repre

sents emplo:Yment-conscious co:rmnunity behavior--given employment the wage per
man is selected to maximize investible surplus as on the

oxbm curve in

i

Figu:ie 2.

The

RW

curve drawn tangent to the family of' iso-employment curves

tepresents the competitive response to different given wage levels.
While this data contained in Figures 4 and 5 are identical, Figure 5
suggests an apparent superiority for perf'ect competition which may be misieading.

The point is that for any wage per man below W , competition
X

achieves a higher investible surplus by reducing employment, by moving in
Figure 5 to geometrically higher iso-employment lines each of which repre
sents a lower level of employment.

But we have already seen when we dis

cussed Figure 2 that the social cost of' providing subsistence for the unem
ployed will exceed the apparent increase in investible surplus attributable
to the competitive f'orm of organization.

It is cheaper to share the work

than to support an unemployed segment of the population. 6
How can our community achieve both full employment and maximum investible surplus with a population in e}tcess of

N

X

?

It cannot do so by en-

couraging perfect competition in its factor and product markets.
result in employment of N

X

minimum feasible hourly wage.
those employed.

This will

the excess population being unemployed, at the
That wage will equal the marginal product of

What is the status in this situation of the classical view

that the existence of unemployment is a signal that hourly wages are too
high?

Suppose in Figure

4 that the actual labor force is

N

n

Full

-22-

V

I

IW
m

Wa.ge pe::·

'

man

N
m

Figure 5

-23-

Wb

employment and maximum investible surplus requires a labor cost of

per

man which implies a higher hourly cost than the competitive wage per man of
WX

To achieve full employment and ensure that subsistence costs are covered

by earned incomes, hourly labor costs must rise not fall.

[cf. 11.]

To ad-

vise our community to maintain perfect competition and to lower the hourly
wage is to propose starvation.
There is, however, one way in which our usual unemployment signal can
be salvaged.

The community can maintain perfect competition and require em

ployers to pay only for the marginal cost of labor, provided the community
taxes the resulting profits and undertakes to make direct supplementary pay
ments to members of the labor force.

In Figure 3, for example, the community

can establish an hourly wage equal to the marginal product of

¾

hours of

work, tax employers for the difference between average and marginal labor
cost and distribute the proceeds equally among those employed.

But we cannot

argue that perfect competition will naturaliy lead to this result in the
absence of the subsistence subsidy to the employed.
Let tis examine now two ways by which coinmunity intervention can im
prove en the cbmpetitive solution without, however; achieving optimal use of
its labor force.

The community can achieve full employment for some popula

tions by specifying an appropriately low wage per man or alternatively the
related high wage per hour and the lower hours of work per person employed.
In Figure 4 the population
wage per man of WC •

Nb , for example, can be fully employed at the

This technique will not work for larger populations,

however, and in any event it fails to maximize investible surplus.

Another technique, discussed in another context-, can now be compared

with the one above.

That technique is to accept the perfectly competitive

solution with respect to wages and employment, and tax profits for the pur
pose of subsidizing the unemployed,
for any labor force in excess of

Nx

Draw a iine,

SU, in Figure 4 showing

the investible su~plus remaining after

meeting bare subsistence needs of the unemployed.

Its intercept on the

horizontal axis will occur at the labor force whose excess over
require total apparent competitive surplus for bare subsistence.
be determined from Figure 2.)

N

X

will

(This can

As this is a sttaight line with a negative

slope, it is necessary that for populations oniy slightly in excess of NX
the legislated wage approach yield a larger investible surplus than the un
employment-sub sidy arrangement~
as

Nb~

lt is possible for larger populations, such

that the unemployment-s ubsidy tedhnique would be superior.

This

conclusion leaves out of consideration, however, the many possible denigra
ting effects associated with unemployment, which is characteristic of the
unemployment-s ubsidy arrangement.
The establishment of monopsonistic arrangements may have advantages
over perfect competition.

Indeed, the community response-to-emp loyment ad

justment is in essence a monopsonistic solution--the community recognizes
that the marginal cost of work effort is different from its average cost
and takes marginal cost into account in seeking to maximize investible sur
plus.

Private monopsonists might achieve the same result and the landlord

situation in many developing countries suggests that as a class landlords
may assume a responsibility to support and employ the community's labor
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force.

The point is that population is fixed only in a social sense and not
The profit-maximizing monopsonist should realize that he

technologically.

can make more profits by reducing employment than he can by employing the
whole labor force.

If a monopsonistic solution is indeed an optimal solu

tion we can infer that behavior is conditioned by social responsibility.
There is another avenue of adjustment which the comm.unity might pursue
in seeking to maximize investible surplus without assuming direct responsi
Instead of influencing private behavior by prescribing

bility for doing so.

wages and hours of work it can simply prescribe full employment allowing
markets to establish wages and hours of work subject to the full employment
The comm.unity would issue to each member of its labor force an

constr~int.

employment chit entitling him to employment with any employer to whom the
chit is presented.

At any given time each employer has a given labor force

which he must employ to best advantage.

In this situation each employer

must regard his labor force as fixed and acting as a monopsonist, employ it
optimally.

Eae!h employer can, however, clct to attract labor, but cannot

fire workers.

If initially labor is randomly ailocated, some employers will

have relatively large numbers of employees while others have relatively
small numbers.

If Figure 4 is interpreted as relating to an Individual

firm, some employers may have
others

N

m

employees.

Nx

employees, others

Nb

employees, and

The larger his labor force the lower the wage

the employer can pay per man.

The nature of the adjustment process which

would ensue cannot be described in detail here.

Part of it would rest on

relative profits; the rest on wages and the mobility of labor.

If labor
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feels that a subsistence income is guaranteed, its preferences between lei
sure and inc6me must be considered, not just the cost of generating work
effort.

If the resulting wage differentials are such that workers seek the

highest wage per man, mobility of labor will ensure that in equilibrium,
wages and hours of work per man are uniform throughout the country.
Growth
The effects of growth on these conclusions can be analyzed effectively
by enlarging on the useful tools provided by Professor Fei [5].
equations (1), (2) and (3) by

Dividing

N, we can rewrite them as follows:
(la)

P* = g(K*, h)

(2a)

E* = m + f{h)

(3a)

V* = P* - E

These three equations are depicted in the upper deck of Figure 6, subject
to the condition that for each value of

_K,

V*

is maximized, i.e.,

I

gh = f'(h), the marginal product of labor hours being equal to their marginal cost.
The relationship between these curves and those usually drawn for the
analysis of growth, irt which work effort per person is a constant,
shown.

Assume, for example, that the wage per man is fixed at

hours of work per man fixed accordingly.
drawn as a function of K*

alone.

As

h

is fixed,

P*X

Wx

is also
and the

can be

As Professor Fei has shown [5:55ff],

the slope of this curve at any point is the marginal product of capital,
and the marginal product of workers,

MP N , is the value at which the
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tangent to P~
X

K*

at the selected

intercepts the vertical axis.

Thus, if

product per man is divided according to the law of marginal productivity,
for any

K*, each worker receives MPN, the balance going as a payment for

the capital he uses.

With perfect competition,

K*

P* would be deter-

and

per man,

wX .

E*

As

N

WX , this condition is met at the same

For the wage,

for which WX = E*.

and the wage

MP

mined by equality between the marginal product of labor,

I*

is drawn so that the marginal product of work

effort equals its marginal cost at every point, it follows that in this case
marginal and average cost are also equal.
Take

But this will not be so for other wage levels.

as an example

W

m

which, being lower than WX , implies fewer hours of work per man, say, one
half of those consistent with the wage,
(la) we can draw a new
of

P*.
X

E*.

curve,

As

P! , simply by

h

is halved in equation

halving the coordinates

A new marginal product of workers curve cart be drawn which will

be equal to the wage
=
W
m

p¾~

wX

W

m

~

at a

K*

which is larger than that for which

The large~ apparent surplus at the larger

is attributable

K*

to the creation of unemployment whose subsistence costs should be deducted
from the apparent surplus.

In the case of

K* for which the wage ,
m

is optimum, the subsistence costs of the unemployed at the

K*

W ,
m

for which

MPN = Wm would exceed the apparent surplus.
The family of

curves which could be drawn each of which is asso-

ciated with one of a family of
curves.

P*

w.l.

curves yields another family of

The envelope curve drawn tangent to this family is

itself being a curve connecting all values on the

p~
l.

V* = P* - E* ,
curves for which

/
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P*,E*,V*

w0

K*

X

Figure 6

"-dRW
d K

K*
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W.l. = E*.

The slope of V*

of capital.

The slope of

at each point is therefore the marginal product
P*

can be called the gross marginal product of

capital from which must be subiracted the marginal supplementary cost of

E*, in o~der to obtain the net marginal product of

labor, the slope of
capital.
The V* = RE*
for~ation of the

curve in the upper deck of Figure 6 is simply a trans

RE

durve in Figure

4.

~he

nw*

curve, the competitive

response to given wages, is aiso sketched and lies wholly below the
curve except for a point of tangency at

K*.
X

Points on the

RE*
curve

have been selected given wages and hours of work on the assumption that

can be adjusted as competition dictates.

Thus

K*

given

K*

W , for ex
m

ample, emerges as that for which the marginal product of workers is equal
to the wage.
by the

RW*

The product per man in excess of the wage, which is revealed
curve, is the return to the capital he uses.

of any ray through the origin to a point on the
marginal product of capital under competition.
that the slope of the

RW*

RW*

Thus the slope

curve represents the

It is important to note

curve itself does not have this characteristic

except where it is tangent to the

V*

curve.

Rather the slope indicates

the marginal rate of return on capital.
The

SU*

curve, representing competitive levels of wages and employ

ment and the subsidized maintenance of the unemployed, has been drawn in
for comparative purposes. 7
Steady state growth in this model requires that output cover the full
cost of labor plus sufficient saving to cause the capital stock,

K, to

grow at the same rate as the labor fo:tce.

V* represents the maximum in

vestible surplus which can be obtained, given any
full cost of labor,

K*, after meeting the

The amount of this which must be invested in order to

cause capital to grow at the same rate as the labor force can be determined
by drawing a ray through the origin with a slope equal to the given rate of
growth of the labor force.

The slope of such a required investment line is

I
I/N
I*
K* = K/N = K , the rate of growth of dapital.
in the upper deck of Figure 6.

One

I*

line has been drawn

Given this rate of growth, the maximum ex

cess consumption per person, consumption over subsistence, needs, is de
termined at that

K*

for which the slope of

I*

equals the slope of V*,

i.e., for which the rate of growth of population and capital equals the mar
ginal product of capital.

This is the golden rule of growth. [10]

If, however, the mode of behavior is that represented by the

RW

curve, namely competitive response to given wages and hours of work, ex
cess consumption is not maximized when the rate of growth equals the mar
ginal product of capital.

Indeed, excess consumption is zero whenever that

cbndition holds, profit being required for investment and each worker re
deiving his marginal product which just covers subsistence given his hours
of work.

If excess consumption is to be maximized in these circumstances,

the wage must be set so that the marginal rate of return, not the average,
is equal to the rate of growth (ths slope of

RW*

equals the slope of

I*).

Then profit will exceed the amount required for investment by the maximum.
The maximum rate of growth which can be sustained is given by the ray
which would be tangent to

V* • This rate of growth of capital and labor

-31-

is identical for all modes of behavior depicted.
nance of a ratio of capital to labor of K*.
X

It will permit the mainte

The achievenent of maximum

excess consumption, therefore, always requires an advanced economy, one i.n
which K*

is equal to or greater than

K* •
X

The important residual functions depicted in the upper deck of Figure 6
have been reproduced as rates of growth in the lower deck.

The

!. , the rate of gro-wth of the population.

is now designated,

I*
V*

curve
becomes

V/K, the maximum rate of growth which could be achieved if all investible
surplus were indeed reinvested.

±t

li~s two branches to the left of

K*X

,

one representing the mode of behavior corresponding to full employment
RE/K; the other representing competitive behavior and the subsidy of the

SU/K.

unemployed,
slope of the

V*

The marginal product of capital, as determined by the

curve in the upper deck, is aiso sho-wn.

Another hori

zontal branch is drawn which corresponds to the marginal product of capital
given the

SU/K pattern of behavior.

For any

K* < K! , the marginal

product is constant as cofupetitors will behave as though K~ = K*.
X

RW/K

curve is depicted as well.

The

It is in this transformation equal to the

marginal product of capital given the mode of behavior it represents.
nally, a segment of the marginal rate of return on capital ,
slope of the RW*

Fi-

dRW
d K, the

curve in the upper deck, has been drawn.

Our three modes of behavior are now depiected in the lower deck of
Figure 6.
RW/K

The competitive-response-to-wages form is indicated by the

curve.

At every point on this curve marginal productivity rules su

preme--labor is paid its marginal product which equals subsistence cost
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and capital is paid its marginal product.

As K*

rises toward K* wages
X

and work effort per man rise but hourly wages fall inducing a more intensive
use of capital and therefore an increase in the marginal product of capital.
Beyond

K*
X

,

further increases in

K*

involve higher hourly wages although

wages and work effort per man continue to rise.

As the marginal product of

work effort rises, the marginal product of capital falls.
al.ways paid its marginal product, profit is

RW = K(MP~)

also indicat~s the average rate of return on capital.

As capital is
and RW/K curve

The curve marginal

dRW is the marginal rate of return. Golden age growth, that
d K '
which maximizes consumption in excess of subsistence needs, is determined
to this,

at

G

C

where the marginal rate of return equals the rate of population

growth.
As this differs from the usual definition of golden age growth which
requires that the marginal product of capital equal the rate of population
growth, it may be helpful to consider these two rules when population gr6'ttth
is zero.

When the marginal product of capital is also zero, product per hour

and perm~ ana consumptiorl per capita wili be maximized.

But all of this

consumption is needed for subsistence leaving nothing for excess consumption.

By reducing K* to the point where the· marginal rate of return is zero,
profit per person will be maximized and as none are needed for investment,
the rate of population growth being zero, excess consumption per person is
also maximized.
A second mode of behavior is applicable only when K*
less than

K*
•
X

is equal to or

Competition rules in both factor and product markets and
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regardless of K*, the level of output, wages, profits and employment will
be those related to

K*.

The smaller

X

K* , the larger the cost of subsi-

dizing the unemployed as represented by the difference between MP; and
SU/K. The maximum rate of return which can be paid to capital, net bf
taxes to cover the unemployment subsidy, and the maximum investible shrplus
are given by the

SU/K

curve and except for

K;, this is less than the

marginal product of capital.
The third mode of behavior, the social insistence on full employment,
is represented by the pair of curves,
marginal to the former.

RE/K and MPK, the latter being

To the right of

K*
X

the usual rule for golden age

growth can be reinstated--maximum excess consumption is achieved when the
marginal product of capital equals the rate of population growth at
Moreover, we can confirm that for any

K* , except

G.

K;, the full employ

ment approach yields a larger investible surplus than does the competitive
response to wages.

It therefore makes possible a higher rate of growth

and a higher return to capital, given
sist at

K*

as low as

K*

m

•

For any

K*, and permits an economy to subK*

less than

K*, this form of
X

behavior also ilnplies that capital· is used more intensively as indicated
by the fact that its marginal product is higher.

Note, however, that

capital cannot be paid its marginal product because investible surplus
after meeting the subsistence cost of labor is insufficient to do so.

Ob

viously labor is being paid more than its marginal product.
For any feasible

K* < K*

X

the full employment approach involves a

use of capital and labor which differs from the competitive-response-to-
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Output, work effort and wages per man are higher

indicatihg the more intensive use of capital, but wages per hour are lower
indicating a more efficient use of the labor force.

An

insistence on full

employment in these circumstances has much to recommend it.
Investment and Emigration
The maximum return to capital which can be paid in our community de
pends upon the method of economic organization and is given in Figure 6 for
K* < K* by one of the three curves,
X

K*

>

K* by either V/K or RW/K.
X

RE/K, RW/K, and SU/K, and for
But the social productivity of capital

on which its use should depend is given by the related marginal products of
capital.

In the developing community the marginal productivity of capital

is highest when labor is fully employed and lowest when competitots respond
to specified wages.

Viewing the community in isolation, we can say that

capital will be most productively used when full employment is insisted up
on.

This is an alternative demonstration of the inferiority of competition.
We must, however, dispose of another possible argument.

The marginal

rate of return on capital when the developing community is competitively
organized

is greater than the marginal rate of returh when the com-

munity insists on full employment

(MPK).

But this simply tells us that

the relative inferiority of competition is reduced as
K;.

K*

is increased to

Moreover, competitors in making capital expansion decisions view wages

as fixed so that their incentive is given by the marginal product of capi
tal as defined in the RW/K curve.

When K*

increases the community finds
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it desirable to raise wages and hours of work per man thus reducing hourly
wages so that the marginal rate of return turns out to be higher than the
marginal product of capital.

This does mean, however, that from the social

point of view the competitively organized community cannot support the
larger populations which can survive with full employment or provide any
population with a larger investible surplus.
Because the incentive for investment in the competitively organized
community is given by the marginal product of capital,

RW/K, and the mar

ginal product of capital in the employment sensitive community,

MPK, is

larger, capital should be more readily increased with the latter type of
organization, the profitability of doing so being more apparent.

If, how

ever, competitors could be induced to respond to the marginal rate of re
turn instead of marginal product, the incentive to invest would be greater
with co~petition, although investible surplus would generally be smaller.
What we must question, however; is the policy prescription often
advanced for developing commutiities that "gove:rmnent should (i) encourage
perfect competition so that the magnitude of competitive profits is revealed
in the factor market, and (ii) adopt policy measures to ensure that all com
petitive response to specified wages and hours of work (the

RW*

minimum..hourly wages with subsidized unemployment (the

curve), there

SU*

curve) or

is a better approach, namely, to insist on full employment and to ensure
that the investible surplus which emerges is indeed invested (the

RE*

curve).
It is clear from an examination of the upper deck of Figure 6 that a
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once and for all increase in capital or reduction in population, either of
which increases

K*, will, for values of

K"~ < K* , increase investible
X

surplus per person and investible surplus per unit of capital whichever of
the three forms of economic organization prevails.

Moreover, for any

K*

and form of organization a proportionate increase or decrease in capital
and labor force will leave investible surplus per person and per unit of
capital unchanged.

We can therefore conclude for developing communities

that the emigration of ¥.. people who take with them less than a propor
tionate share of capital,
and if they take more than

y_K*, will improve the iot of those who remain,
¥._K*

capital with them those who remain will

be worse off.
These conclusions must be modified for advanced communities, those
for which

K* is greater than K*.
X

In this range with

the emigration of people without capital must reduce
V·, total investible surplus.

K

constant,

V/K and therefore

If, before emigration, total investible

surplus was distributed among those not emigrating, the amount to be dis
tributed among them after emigration is smaller and they a.re worse off.
If emigrants take a proportionate share of capital with them, the weifare
of those remaining is unaffected.

If, however, emigrants take more than

a proportionate share of capital with them,
must rise.

V/K, the return on capital,

The non-emigrants now earn a higher return on their unchanged

capital and as their labor income just covers subsistence needs, investi
ble surplus per non-emigrant must be higher than before.
The effects of emigration and related capital movements on investible
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surplus can be identified in the lower deck of Figure 6 also.

The non

emigrant group always has the same capital and the same population after
emigration as before.

As wages just cover subsistence, the group's inves

tible surplus, total and per capita, depends only on the average rate of
return.
to

K*

X

Whatever the form of organization this is seen to rise with
and to fall thereafter.

If emigrants own and take out less than

a proportionate share of capital,
falls.

K*

K*

rises; if they take out more,

For developing communities a rise (fall) in

K*

K*

raises (lowers)

the rate of return and the investible surplus of non-emigrants; for ad
vanced communities a rise (fall) in

K*

reduces (raises) the investible

surplus of non-emigra.nts. 8
This analysis suggests that emigration of the poor or unemployed :from
a developing community to an advanced community will raise total investible
surplus and investible surplus per capita among the non-movers in both com
munities.

The emigration of the wealthier from a developing community will

make those remaining worse off.

The effect of their immigration on the

former population of the advanced country will depend on whether the immi
grants are relatively wealthier or poorer than the former population.

If

they are wealthier, the former population will be worse off; if they are
poorer, the former population will be better off.
Supply Curves 2 Profits and Discretionary Income
The cost of producing individual work effort cannot legitimately be
regarded as an individual's supply curve because this would imply that

-38-

howe~er high the rate at which he can exchange work for income .he would pre
fer to work such long hours that his income would just cover his subsistence.
Rather the subsistence cost curve provides a guide to the individual's in
difference map and indicates the minimum possible cost of obtaining any given
level of wbrk effort from him, or alternatively his biological maximum work
effort for a given wage per man.
The subsistence cost curve itself might be an indifference curve but
this would suggest that an individual is equally happy with bare subsistence
The alternative would require

regardless of the work effort demanded of him.

the individual to prefer slow starvation to at least some very high levels
of work effort.
dure.

The indifference map in Figure 7 follows the first proce

The assumption is made that the marginal rate of substitution between

income and leisure increases as income rises.

As usual hourly wages are

indicated by rays through the origin, the minimum feasible hourly wage being
tangent to the subsistence cost curve.
The tangency condition bet~een indifference curves and wage rate lines
generates a supply curve for wage incomes above

wX .

Below that level,

special institutional arrangements are requited to make a supply cu:t-ve meaningful.

We shall proceed as follows.

A wage per man equal to or below WX

specified as the maximum amount a member of the labor force can receive.
Successively lower hourly wage rates (or piece work rates) are then estab
lished at which up to the maximum income can be earned.

The hours of work

supplied at the lowest hourly rate at which the employee can (as limited
by the subsistence cost curve) and will (as limited by his indifference

is
S
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W·* ,E*

M

0

h

F'igure

7

-40map) earn the maximum income is the supply related to that wage per man.
Given the wage per man, competition among workers would bring about this ef
fect.

This more complicated technique can be used tor higher incomes as well.
The supply curve thus produced coincides with the subsistence cost curve

up to the minimum average cost but lies above it thereafter.

The community

by specifying minimum hourly wages in excess of minimum average cost or by
meeting directly a specified amount ot subsistence cost could cause the ag
gregate supply curve to lie above the subsistence cost curve to the left
of minimum average cost also.

And, of course, the supply curve could bend

backward beginning at some hourly wage rate above minimum average cost per

hour, but we will not deal with this possibility .
Such a supply curve aggregated for the labor force can be written

(4) w=
We also define

N(m +

W, which will
elicit h hours ot work from
each ot -N men)

e(h)

(wage bill,

'

D = W- E

and redefine investible surplus,

(disdretion ary inoome of workers)
V, as follows:

(3a) V = (P-W) + (W-E)

(investible surplus equals pro
fits of enterprises plus dis
cretionary income of workers)

Dividing (5) through by N, we write for each worker
(5a) D* = W* - E*

and assume that in the range for which

D*

is positive,

2
dH*
-d
h > O and -d D* > O , i.e. , the marginal discretiona ry income demanded
2
dh
d2~
by a worker increases with hours of work. As ddW*h and dh
2 must both
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d D*

be greater than zero,

-- >

dW*

2

O, i.e., in this range the

higher the wage paid per man, the higher the proportion of it which must be
discretionary income.
This conclusion carries with it an implication which must be put in
its proper place, namely, that aggregate discretionary income, which may be
saved, is maximized by giving any wage bill entirely to one person.

This

suggests that our earlier conclusion that an equal distribution of work
(and workers incomes) is a prerequisite to maximizing investible surplus
may have to be modified.

This is not so.

Any given aggregate hours of

work can still be obtained at lowest social cost by dividing the work
equally among all members of the labor force.

Therefore total investible

surplus, profits of employers plus discretionary income of workers, is
still maximized, given aggregate work effort, by dividing the work equal
ly.

An unequal division of the same work will raise social cost and dis..

c1·etiona,ry income at the expense of profits or community surplus, but total
investible surplus will be reduced.

Indeed, the equal division of work

lninimizes aggregate discretionat-y income while maximizing profits and iri
vestible surplus.
It is now the supply curve rather than the cost curve of labor which
limits the employment and utilization of labor.

Moreover, for a given

labor force, the supply price exceeds the cost of generating work effort
only when the amount of work effort demanded exceeds that which can be
produced at minimum hourly cost.

But this is precisely the criterion for

distinguisM.ng an advanced from a developing community.

The analysis of

-42developing communities, as exemplified by total hours of work in excess of

HX

in Figure 2, any labor force in excess of

less than

K*
X

N

X

in Figure 4 and any

K*

in Figure 6, is therefore unaffected because for these ranges

of the variables the supply curve and the cost curve of work effort are
the same. 9
For the advanced community, however, the introduction of our supply
curve modifies our earlier conclusions.

First, any labor force will sup

ply the same work effort as before only if the wage biil is higher, thus
creating for the workers some discretionary income.
higher average and marginal wage per hour.
and total investible surplus,

But this implies a

What happens to profits, P-W *

P-E, depends on the form of community

organization.
If the community is competitively organized the initial increase in
hourly wages will induce firms to reduce output and hours of work until
hourly wages have fallen to equality with marginal product, which must,
however, be higher than before.

With given capital, the marginal product

of capital and profits must be lower than before.

But discretionary in

come has been created in the process so investible surplus may have in
creased and indeed it usually must.

Consider that in the relevant range

marginal exceeds average subsistence cost.

In the neighborhood where

marginal product equals average subsistence cost, the competitive case,
the reduction in hours worked must reduce total subsistence cost more
than total product. Investible surplus must increase. 10 We conclude
that in both decks of Figure 6 to the right of

K*

X

the introduction of
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labor supply considerations will cause the
those drawn.

RW

curves to lie somewhat above

If discretionary income is excluded from consideration, curves

reflecting only profits of enterprises, and therefore, competitive decisions,
would lie somewhat below the

RW curves drawn.

If the community is already organized to maximize investible surplus
given the labor force, the substitution of the labor supply curve for the
cost curve must reduce total investible surplus.

Any given total work ef

fort now has a higher marginal cost than before so total product, work
effort and profits must be reduced.

Moreover, the reduction in work 'effort

will raise marginal product and reduce marginal subsistence cost which were
equal before.

·

·

·

Investible surplus is therefore also reduced.

then that in both decks of Figure 6 to the right of

K*

X

the

11

We conclude

RE

curves

will lie below those drawn.
As it is unlikely that discretionary income of workers will be re
vealed in the marketplace we cannot say for the advanced community whether
total investible surplus will be larger with competition or not.

We can,

however, say that, as output and work effort given the labor force will
be larger in the advanced community when it is competitively organized,
the discretionary income of workers will also be larger, and profits will
be smaller.

By this criterion competition is restored to its traditional

position of superiority in the advanced community, but not in the develop
ing community with which we have been principally concerned.

-44-

Policy Suggestions and Reservatiop~
While the model discussed in this article may have a degree of inter
nal rigor, it is very narrow in scope.
is therefore a risky undertaking.

Drawing policy conclusions from it

The model does suggest, however, some

characteristics of economic behavior and policy alternatives or insights
which may merit further investigation in more realistic settings.
;

It has been suggested, for example, that apparent leisure and poverty
may go hand in hand, that short hours of work are consistent with high
labor-capital ratios while longer hours of work are profitable in more
fortunate circumstances.

But a number of factors relevant to such a con-

clusion have not been considered.

The optimum intensity of work effort

may vary with the magnitude and compostion of a diet in such a way that
units of work effort increase within the dame or an even shorter span of
time.

Changes in skills, the organization of work and the nature of other

factors of production have also been left aside.

Seasonal considerations

have been omitted and tastes and technology have been assumed constant.
Moreover, social attitudes towards work, the nature of incentives and
penalties, institutional patterns of work distribution, and the nature of
iand tenure systems have been disregarded.

Nevertheless, the suggestion

lingers when one notes the continuing concern with so-called underemploy
ment in developing nations.

Certainly there are circumstances in which

apparent poverty may result from a voluntary preference for leisure.

The

suggestion here is that there are other, more usual settings in which low
work effort per man is a logical way to make the most out of poverty.

12
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The suggestion has also been made that competition may be an inferior
method of economic organization in developing communities from the point of
view of maximizing investible surplus because it creates unemployment and
results in an inefficient use of the labor force,

It may, however, be an

irresistible force, once stablished, for containing the rate of population
growth--a kind of assist for the Malthusian checks.

More to the point,

nothing has been said about the uses to which an investible surplus might
be put.

A monopsonistic, landlord-dominated community may provide full

employment and maximum investible surplus but appropriate thh latter for
the luxurious living, conspicuous and otherwise, of the landlord class. [6]
It is not readily apparent that maximizing investible surplus will also
maximize the amount invested or direct that amount to the most profitable
uses.

This raises questions not only of the propensities to save of dif

ferent classes of people, but also of the taxability of surplus in differ
ent hands.

Efforts to tax large numbers of small competitors may be less

successful and more costly than taxing a few monopsonists or cooperatives
or operating through government enterprises.

The suggestion remains that

competition may be an inferior method of organization in labor surplus
communities.
Competition implies as well that labor and capital will be paid ac
cording to their marginal products.

It is in this sense a system which

economizes the use of resources in an impersonal way, discarding surplus
labor as it would surpluses of other resources.

But if a social priority

is accorded to people and their maintenance has a first claim on total
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product, labor in developing communities should be paid directly or indirect
ly more than its marginal product, the marginal cost of generating work
effort being equated to marginal product.
maximum investible surplus.

We have then full employment and

It foilows, of course, that capital receives

less than its marginal product.
The model suggests as well a sympathetic view of those developing coun
tires which insist on. ftili employment as a top development priority.

There

is a danger, of course, that this insistence may be inconsistently coupled
with legislated minimum wages and institutionally rigid hours of work.

The

suggestion rather is that unemployment might be alieviated and investible
surplus increased by insisting that the labor force be employed but permit
ting hours of work per worker to be reduced (work sharing) and wages per
man to fall although the hourly wage should rise.

This approach contradicts

the competitive model's response to unemployment which treats unemployment
as a signal that hourly wages are too high and as a problem which can only
be solved by reducing wage rates.
fact that

a wage

But the competitive model ignores the

rate which would bring about full empio;yment is too low

to permit subsistence.

The low wage rate and full employment couid be made

consistent with subsistence by the subsidy of workers from the taxation
of profits.

Without this supplementary mechanism competition among firms

and workers will not work.

The insistence on full employment avoids the

need for a subsidy arrangements of this kind.
Possibly our analytical constructs so often designed and useful for
advanced country situations, may lead us astray in considering developing
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If, as suggeste d, a margina l product wage and full employment

are incompa tible in developi ng commun ities without special supplem entary
arrangem ents~ it should not be surprisi ng if models based on these assump
tions steer us in wrong directio n.
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1

Similar figures appear in [8:66] and [13:282]. Much of Professor
Brody's book [3] is devoted to assembling evidence in support of the diminishing returns hypothesis with respect to animals.
2

on the other hand, if the work energy curve exhibited increasing re
turns throughout, the poirit determined above would be a minimum and the
optimum use of any aggregate diet would be to give the excess over main
tenance requirements to one man.
If the work energy curve first exhibits increasing returns followed
by diminishing returns, low excesses of aggregate diets over maintenance
should go to one man, intermediate excesses may be divided unequally,
while larger excesses should be shared equally.
3we wish to maximize
V = g (K,H) - N(m + f(h) with K, N and m
given. As the production function is linear and homogeneous, this equation can be rewritten as

V = g (-,
K
-N
N
When

K, N and m are given,
l

gh =

h) = [m ~ f(h)]

V

N, and therefore

V, is maximized when

l
fh ,

i.e., when marginal product equals marginal cost.

4rnputs less than

H
would not be consistent with the full use of
non-labor resources becau~e their marginal product would be negative.
For H < H it would be preferable to reduce proportionately the non-labor
0
resources used maintaining their marginal product at zero.

51et V* =

i

and
and it can be shown that

Then we can write
V*

V* = g(K* , h) - [m + f(h)],

is a maximum when

l
l
g;:- = f h
h

and

l
g-*=O
K
, 1·e
• •,

when the marginal product of capital is zero (or the average product of hours
a maximum -H
in Figure 2) and marginal product equals marginal cost of work
0
effort.
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dK*
1 dh
- + gdN

h dN

The last two terms are equal by definition on the obxm curve in Figure 2.
and with K given, the first term is negative to the right of H , There0
fore V* declines as population rises.

6Professor Leibenstein
has employed a diagram involving the RW curve

in Figure 5 and one of the iso-empldyn1ent curves to demonstrate the possi
bility of increasing investible surplus through full employment. [8:73[

There are however, two points in his argument which requires modifi
cation. We can posit employers a wa~e pet man, which determines also his
hours of work and therefore the hourly w~ge, and ask how many workers would
be demanded when the wage per man equals. marginal product. The locus of
such equilibrium points (which incidentally is unlikely to be tangent to
the various marginal product curves as Professor Leibenstein has depicted
it in his Figure 6) represents as he says, "in a sense, a demand curve for
labor." (8:71] It is, however, quite another thing to argue as he does
[8:74] that. competition among workers can bring about wages per man lower
than w ih our Figure 5 or less than Wx in Leibenstein's Figure 6-6.
Employers are in the business of hiring hours of work, not workers, and
wages per man below W imply higher hourly wages. Competition among
X
workers must be anaiyzed in terms of a supply curve relating hourly wages
to aggregate hottts Of work. in Figure 3, for example, the supply curve
when populatioh is Nb is ho~izonta1 to the minimum point on the Nb
curve and follows that curve the~eafter. A wage per man below Wx cannot
be brought about through competition among workers. [Cf. 12:287]

1

I

The second point is Prdfesso~ Leibenstein's puzzling conclusion that
landlords as a group are better off ilto employ the entire labor force •.•
and yet not utilize the entire labor force. 11 [6 :76]
We see in Figure 5, for example, .that with a labor force of Nb the government can ensure full employment under competitive conditions by fixing the
wage per man at W • But investible sutplus can be increased by abandonc
ing competition, raising wages to Wb and insisting on full employment.
As a consequence aggregate and average hours of work and total output will
increase. Clearly the labor force is more fully utilized than before.
W nnacott (12:296] and Ezekiel (4:516] have also noted this discrepancy.
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7The equation for this curve, valid for

K*

<

is

K*X

+ M

V

SU= -M + ( ~*

) K* •

X

8This conclusion differs from that reached by Professors Berry and
Soligo [l] when K* > K* , the range with which they deal. They use per
capita income rather thin investible surplus per non-emigrant as their
criterion and make no deduction for subsistence needs. Let aK = non
emigrant's capital before and after emigration and SN= numbers of non
emigrants. Then the per capita income of non-emigrants before and after
emigration, assuming factors receive their marginal product is,
MP

where

K* = K/N

N

+ (a K*) MP
S
K

before emigration and

MPK

and

MPN

are evaluated before

emigration at K* and after emigration at aK*. In the figure, the per
capita income of non-emigrants before emigra~ion is the wage MPN, plus
return per capita on their own capital,
returns, is clearly greater than
capita income after emigration.

P~

at

~;(MPK) •

}K*,

The sum of these two

which is the group's per

The conclusion is unaffected when the

Therefore, in the case con
positions of K* and ~* are reversed.
sidered by Professors Berry and Soligo, non-emigrants are worse off with
emigration except in the special case in which

~ •

9we recognize, however, that a community might take leisure into

account by producing with a given labor force to the point where an aggre
gated or community indifference curve is tangent to the total product
curve. In that case we would expect the oxbm equilibrium curve to be
unchanged at m, but as population decreases, to lie proportionately more
to the left indicating as investible surplus per man increases that greater
degrees of leisure can be afforded,

10Let

E/H = e.

Then investible surplus, V, can be written:
V = P -

He, and

dV dP
Hde _ e •
dH -dH - dh
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P/N

'--------------J .---LK_*_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _K-:-/N
~ K*

o

8

Figure, fn. 8
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dP
dV
In the neighb orhood where dH
= e , dH
increa ses inves tible surplu s.

11Inves

tible surplu s,

O • A fall in total hours of work

P-E, is maximized when

Behav ior which now seeks to maximize P-W reduce s total work effort
and
produc t so that :: ~ and inves tible surplu s is no longer maxim
ized.
12Note should
be taken of Ester Boseru p's' sugge stion that increa
popula tion is likely to be accompanied by increa sing hours of work sing
per
person . [2) The thrust df her argument is that a growing popul ation
densit y will stimu late techno logica l changes which on the whole will
be
labor using.
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